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COMMENT 
THE FEDERALIST'S PLAIN 
MEANING: REPLY TO TUSHNET 
ANITA L. ALLEN* 
The Federalist is a polemical defense of the proposed 1787 Constitu­
tion of the United States. 1 The series of eighty-five essays composed by 
James Madison, Alexander Hamilton and John Jay was first published 
in New York newspapers under the collective pseudonym Publius. 
Through his original reading of The Federalist, Professor Tushnet charts 
unexplored connections among theories of judicial selection and tenure, 
judicial accountability, and constitutional interpretation. 
Tushnet maintains that there is a sinkhole in The Federalist's land­
scape. Publius would require life-tenure federal judges to be kept 
accountable to the enlightened preferences of a free people by doing the 
impossible: interpreting legal texts in accordance with their plain or 
common sense meanings. Yet, Tushnet urges, experience and theory 
demonstrate that legal texts do not have "plain meaning." The reality of 
honest disputes over meaning devastates "the interpretative project of 
The Federalist, and with it The Federalist's defense of judicial review."2 
My response to Professor Tushnet comes in the form of reactions to 
the arguments set out in his paper. The three Parts below present my 
understanding and assessment of those arguments. I am in sympathy 
both with Tushnet's descriptive analysis of The Federalist and with his 
conviction that there is no easy sanctuary in plain meaning adjudication. 
Much of what I will say is thus corroborative.3 
* Associate Professor of Law, Georgetown University. Ph.D. 1979, University of Michigan; 
J.D. 1984, Harvard University. 
I. THE FEDERALIST at viii-ix ( 1961) (introduction by Clinton Rossiter). 
2. Tushnet, Constitutional Interpretation and Judicial Selection: A View From The Federalist 
Papers, 61 S. CAL. L. REv. 1669, 1699 (1988). 
3. I do not plan to separately discuss Tushnet's contention that The Federalist papers imply 
an important connection between judicial tenure and a theory of interpretation. As Tush net explains 
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The thrust of my critical commentary is, first, to emphasize that 
although The Federalist relies on common sense and common law 
approaches to interpretation, no single theory of constitutional interpre­
tation receives a sustained development or defense. Despite internal and 
external evidence of a plain meaning theory, recalcitrant passages in the 
essays appear to deny that written law has plain meaning. These 
passages demand reconciliation. Second, the lack of definition in the 
plain meaning theories which Tushnet ascribed both to The Federalist 
and recent Supreme Court opinions blunts the impact of his central 
claims. Third, while Tushnet contends plain meaning interpretation can­
not measure up to "modernist social and linguistic philosophy,"4 the 
yardstick he employs is of uncertain philosophic dimensions. As a conse­
quence, his seemingly broad assertion that any and all versions of plain 
meaning theory are futile is not entirely convincing. 5 
I. 
The pivotal thesis of Professor Tushnet's paper is that The Federalist 
assumes an untenable plain meaning theory of constitutional interpreta­
tion. Is he correct? Does The Federalist assume a plain meaning theory? 
in his article, Tushnet, supra note 2, at 1680-89, The Federalist's democratic vision requires judicial 
accountability; but, contrary to Madison's and Hamilton's arguments, it does not require judges to 
be appointed as opposed to elected or to have life tenure. Tushnet's insight is that Madison's argu­
ments only support the appointment of judges for terms which are relatively long when compared to 
the terms of members of the political branches. These long terms insulate judges from powerful 
minority factions and powerful majorities that, from time to time, lose sight of the public good. The 
structural safeguard of a separate, independent federal judiciary is a good practical assurance but it is 
not foolproof. Like other citizens, judges are capable of losing sight of the public good and becoming 
a powerful minority faction. A normative theory of interpretation is needed to account for how 
courts are obligated to apply the fundamental law of the people. 
A few brief remarks about the necessity vel non of life-tenure. Judges who know they are likely 
to return to private life after a term of years on the bench will have special incentives to decide cases 
so as to enhance their reputations among those in the private sector on whose good graces they will 
most depend after retirement from the bench. This could result in individual judges subtly aligning 
themselves with special interests. To minimize this possibility, life-tenure and attractive fixed sala­
ries, as urged in The Federalist, would seem prudent. 
That the institution of life-tenure relies heavily on the pers-:Jna! commitments of judges cannot 
be overstressed. Life-tenure works only if judges accede to the expectation that they remain in office 
for extended periods. If appointed or elected judges were frequently to resign their posts in pursuit 
of greater opportunity, life-tenure and
. 
the values it protects would be threatened. The notions of 
"judicial character" and "judicial temperament" surely ought to include a personal commitment to 
substantial longevity and isolation on the bench. 
4. Tushnet, supra note 2, at 1693. 
5. Tushnet raises the possibility that some sophisticated contemporary version of plain mean­
ing theory might escape his criticisms. See id. at 1688. But I read him as unpersuaded and raising 
objections which, if they panned out, would be objections in principle. 
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Tushnet's affirmative answer relies upon both internal (textual and logi­
cal) and external (historical) evidence. Before turning to his evidence, I 
would like to air preliminary concerns about the meaning of "plain 
meaning." 
The meaning of "plain meaning" and the centreal tenents of the 
plain meaning interpretative theory which Tushnet found in The Federal­
ist were never spelled out. Yet, as a term applied to describe a normative 
theory of interpretation, "plain meaning" lacks plain meaning. A defini­
tion of this term quickly becomes crucial for deciding whether The Fed­
eralist assumes a plain meaning theory and no other. Absent a working 
understanding of the expression "plain meaning theory," the search for 
internal evidence of a plain meaning theory in The Federalist cannot have 
a precise direction. 
Precision is needed to decide the functional equivalence (or other 
pertinent relationship) of the various interpretative norms Tushnet 
attributes to The Federalist and the Supreme Court: namely, that judges 
ought to render the law in accordance with ( 1) common sense, (2) natu­
ral and obvious senses, (3) manifest tenor, (4) explicit and unambiguous 
language, (5) precise terms, and (6) plain meaning. Tushnet's criticisms 
are only as powerful as his intended target is well-defined.6 
Tushnet argued that The Federalist relied upon a futile plain mean­
ing theory. Not only was it futile in theory, as established by modern 
linguistics and social theory, but it was also futile in practice, as evi­
denced by recent Supreme Court opinions ostensibly undertaking plain 
meaning adjudication. 7 A degree of precision about plain meaning and 
related interpretative theories is important for Tushnet's cross-historical 
argument. He argued that contemporary failures at adjudication 
through appeal to, for example, "explicit and unambiguous provisions" 
also evidence the futility of The Federalist's plain meaning theory. 8 Yet, 
Tushnet himself made the point that the changed meaning of "common 
6. Consider what would be involved in specifying the terms of a plain meaning theory. Most 
words have meanings, but some, like articles and expletives, seem sometimes only to have function. 
The meaning of a word can be distinguished from its senses, its senses from its referents, and its 
denotations from its connotations. And to what is plain meaning to be contrasted-ambiguous 
meaning? vagueness? obscurity? meaninglessness? pointlessness? On what does plain meaning 
depend-internal logic? mental states? purposes? uses? All these questions about word meaning 
arise before one even gets to analogous inquiries about propositional meaning. 
7. See Immigration and Naturalization Service v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 945 (1982). 
8. See infra notes 24-30 and accompanying text (summary of Tushnet's argument that con­
temporary and 18th century plain meaning theories are similarly flawed). 
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sense" would complicate contemporary adaptation of plain meaning the­
ory. 9 No straightforward identification of The Federalist's reliance on 
"common sense" construction with conte�porary reliance on what we 
call "common sense" is really possible. Tushnet has put his finger on one 
important instance of a general problem that can only be solved by an 
exposition, more specific than the one he has given, of the tenets of the 
plain meaning theory attributed to The Federalist. 
In all likelihood, the plain meaning theory attacked in Tushnet's 
Symposium paper is a brand of the "extremely implausible" textualism 
he has sought to discredit elsewhere on the ground, inter alia, that it 
purports to give us courts without politics. 10 Textualism is any anti­
interpretivist theory of legal interpretation which contends: 
[A]t least some provisions of the Constitution need not be interpreted 
but only applied because they are entirely clear, because the meaning 
of the text is available to courts without interpretation, or because the 
text itself excludes enough possible interpretations to reduce the dan­
gers thought to lurk in unrestrained constitutional interpretation." 1 1  
The textualist contention, when expanded beyond the Constitution to 
include legislative texts, appears to form the core of the plain meaning 
theory which Tushnet alleges The Federalist proffers as a solution to the 
problem of judicial unaccountability. 
II. 
Notwithstanding the problem of defining "plain meaning," I now 
consider whether Tushnet is correct that The Federalist assumes a plain 
meaning theory. I will proceed with a rough understanding of plain 
meaning theory as the view that (to paraphrase Tushnet) grasping the 
meaning of legal texts does not require interpretation or that the meaning 
of such texts is plain enough to exclude sufficient interpretations to 
diminish the dangers of unrestrained interpretation. 
Relying on logical, historical and textual evidence, Tushnet argues 
that The Federalist assumes a "strong theory about interpretation," 
namely, a plain meaning theory. 12 As logical evidence Tushnet uses his 
deduction that the plain meaning theory is a virtual entailment of The 
Federalist's view of government and judicial review. The argument from 
9. Tushnet, supra note 2, at 1694. 
10. Tushnet, A Note on the Revival ofTexwalism in Constiwtiona/ Theory, 58 S. CAL. L. REV. 
683 ( 1982). 
II. !d. at 683. 
12. Tushnet, supra note 2, at 1670-1689. 
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logic also reflects a sense of history. Tushnet suggests that the internal 
logic of The Federalist moves ineluctably toward the need for a norma­
tive theory of interpretation. Such a theory augments the fruits of the 
"incredibly productive"13 search for structural guarantees that led to the 
idea of federalism, the separation of powers, and a life-tenured federal 
judiciary. At stake in the search was nothing less than the enlightened 
protection of natural rights and the public good. A normative theory 
was needed to reconcile judicial review and the possibility of factious 
judicial tyranny with judicial accountability to a democratic people. 
For what reason did the authors of The Federalist assume the plain 
meaning theory over other normative theories? Tushnet's answer is that 
they made the assumption naturally, because doing so was an easy adap­
tation of Enlightenment assumptions about the powers of human rea­
son 14 and prevailing common law interpretative traditions. 15 He also 
answers that they did so prudently, because Hamilton feared that a more 
subtle theory might alienate ordinary citizens from constitutional dis­
course. I suppose the idea here is that even if Hamilton believed that a 
more subtle theory were true, he still would have advanced the plain 
meamng theory to facilitate civic education about republican judicial 
rev1ew. 
Tushnet's answer 1s m line with H. Jefferson Powell's conclusion 
that "The Philadelphia framers' primary expectation regarding constitu­
tional interpretation was that the Constitution, like any other legal docu­
ment, would be interpreted in accord with its express language."16 
Hamilton and other federalists defended the Constitution against anti­
federalist skeptics by arguing that "It was . . .  the people's unquestiona­
bly republican intention, evinced in the plain, obvious meaning of the 
text, that would control future interpretations."17 
Powell's historical perspectives do not rule out, however, alterna­
tives to the plain meaning theory. Eighteenth-century republican theory 
is compatible with an interpretive strategy that is frankly contractarian. 18 
13. Jd. at 1688. 
14. See generally M. WHITE, PHILOSOPHY, THE FEDERALIST, AND THE CONSTITUTION 
(1987) (discussing philosophy underlying The Federalist). 
15. Cf Powell, The Original Understanding of Original Intent, 98 HARV. L. REv. 885, 894, 
903 (1985) (discussing historical origins of original intent as an interpretative norm). 
16. Jd. at 903. 
17. Id. at 907. 
18. D. RICHARDS, TOLERATION AND THE CONSTITUTION 46-64 (1986) (contractarian inter­
pretative theory applied to first amendment and privacy jurisprudence). 
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A contractarian theory would prescribe that the meaning of constitu­
tional text is to be determined by reference to "what rights and powers 
sovereign polities (and individuals] could delegate to a common agent 
without destroying their own essential autonomy."19 Contractarian 
interpretative theory may be more subtle than simple-minded plain 
meaning theory. But, as argued below, no simple-minded plain meaning 
theory can be plausibly attributed to The Federalist. It is not obvious, 
then, that a contractarian interpretative theory would have struck early 
federalists as significantly more subtle--or less restrictive-than a plain 
meaning theory. Indeed it could be argued that knowledge of the 
requirements of rational agreement and moral autonomy on which social 
contract theory rests would have been deemed as accessible as knowledge 
of the plain meaning of fundamental law. Both would have been con­
ceived of as accessible to reason and common sense. 
One finds very little direct internal textual evidence for the view that 
The Federalist assumes a plain meaning interpretative theory. Tushnet 
seems to have correctly identified the best evidence of this theory at work 
in Hamilton's claim, in The Federalist 83, that "the natural and obvious 
sense of (the Constitution's] provisions, apart from any technical rules, is 
the true criterion of construction."20 Hamilton's reference to the "natu­
ral and obvious sense" of constitutional provisions implies that the Con­
stitution is accessible by virtue of its alleged plain meaning. Hamilton's 
reference in The Federalist 78 to the "manifest tenor of the constitution," 
may carry the same implication.2 1 
While passages in The Federalist 83 bring to mind a plain meaning 
theory, language in other passages can be read as a rejection of a plain 
meaning theory. Most notably, language in The Federalist 22 seems to 
19. Powell, supra note 15, at 888. 
20. THE FEDERALIST No. 83, at 497 (A. Hamilton) (C. Rossiter ed. 1961). 
2 1. THE FEDERALIST No. 78, at 466 (A. Hamilton) (C. Rossiter ed. 1961). Hamilton's refer­
ence to the "manifest tenor of the Constitution" can be read as implying that, when encountered by a 
person competent in the English language, the Constitution has a readily discernible (i.e. , plain) 
meaning which courts should apply. But the proposed reading places a great deal of weight on the 
word "manifest," while it ignores the ambiguity of the word "tenor." It is not apparent from the 
context why one should construe "tenor" as synonymous with "meaning." Hamilton's exact state­
ment was that "Limitations of this kind can be preserved in practice no other way than through the 
medium of the courts of justice, whose duty it must be to declare all acts contrary to the manifest 
tenor of the constitution void." THE FEDERALIST 78, at 466 (A. Hamilton) (C. rossiter ed. I 961 ). 
Under present day idiomatic American usage, "tenor" and "meaning" are seldom synonyms except 
possibly where "meaning" is used to refer to connotative, as opposed to denotative, meaning. So 
used, the "tenor" of a text could refer to the set of all that the text connotes. 
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go against the grain of plain meaning theories. Addressing the argu­
ments of his confederationist opponents against a federal judiciary, Ham­
ilton wrote that, "Laws are a dead letter without courts to expound and 
define their true meaning and operation.'m Hamilton's words are 
ambiguous; yet, they can be readily construed as the words of a "judicial 
activist" or other interpretivist who rejects plain meaning and holds that 
courts impart meaning to law through appeal to political, moral or eco­
nomic goals rather than "dead letter" scratches in ink. It would be 
admittedly absurd to imply without regard to extrinsic evidence that 
Hamilton was a proponent of a strongly interpretivist theory. I merely 
suggest that not everything said about the judicial role in The Federalist 
points unambiguously towards a plain meaning theory of interpretation. 
In The Federalist 22, continuing his defense of a federal judiciary, 
Hamilton contended as follows respecting the treaties of the United 
States: "Their true import, as far as respects individuals, must, like all 
other laws, be ascertained by judicial determinations. To produce uni­
formity in these determinations, they ought to be submitted, in the last 
resort, to one SUPREME TRIBUNAL."23 This argument for a federal 
judiciary is based on the need for uniformity and finality and implies that 
treaties and other legal documents do not have plain meaning. For adju­
dicative uniformity and finality would seem to follow from interpretative 
uniformity and finality, which would itself seem to follow from the prac­
tice of rendering texts in accordance with their plain meaning. Hamil­
ton's concern for uniformity and finality implies that he held one of two 
beliefs about the need for a federal judiciary. He must have believed 
either that (1) the meaning of texts is significantly and impracticably 
indeterminate and a final arbiter is needed, or (2) state judges lack the 
common sense, reason, skill, and character needed to decide cases in 
accordance with the plain meaning of the written law. 
According to Tushnet, The Federalist's vision of democratic govern­
ment and judicial review requires a normative theory of interpretation 
that keeps the structurally independent judiciary accountable to the will 
of the people as expressed in their constitution and statutes. A normative 
theory of interpretation which obliges judges to place democratic ideals 
and individual rights above their own preferences is called for by The 
Federalist's conception of government and judicial review. A plain 
meaning theory could fill the bill and, according to Tushnet, it did. 
22. THE FEDERALIST No. 22, at 150 (A. Hamilton) (C. Rossiter ed. 1961). 
23. !d. 
. i l l 
1708 SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 61:1701 
It is important to keep in mind that a normative theory of interpre­
tation was not a device that the authors of The Federalist emphasized. 
Insofar as the plain meaning theory can be found, expressly or by impli­
cation, in The Federalist, it is offered alongside a variety of other theories 
and arguments aimed at assuring readers that the institution of life-ten­
ure federal judges would further, rather than undermine, the public 
good, individual rights, and majoritarian self-government. 
In the first instance, The Federalist stressed the structural con­
straints on the judiciary. The judiciary was but one branch of govern­
ment in the constitutional scheme. Judges who breached standards of 
"good behavior" were subject to impeachment by Congress. The Feder­
alist 78 and 81 stressed the judiciary's lack of the power of the purse and 
the sword. Even if the judiciary developed a will contrary to the public 
interest and ceased to exercise proper judgment, it had no means to 
finance or execute its will. 
The Federalist recognized that structural constraints are not abso­
lutely infallible. But the main point is that a good deal of faith was 
placed in them. Hamilton argued that structural constraints are so effec­
tive in general that practical persons who know history, political science, 
and human nature have no genuine grounds for concern: 
It may in the last place be observed that the supposed danger of judici­
ary encroachments on the legislative authority which has been upon 
many occasions reiterated is in reality a phantom. Particular miscon­
structions and contraventions of the will of the legislature may now 
and then happen; but they can never be so extensive as to amount to an 
inconvenience, or in any sensible degree to affect the order of the polit­
ical system. This may be inferred with certainty from the general 
nature of the judicial power, from the objects to which it relates, from 
the manner in which it is exercised, from its comparative weakness, 
and from its total incapacity to support its usurpations by force. And 
the inference is greatly fortified by the ... important constitutional 
check which is the power of instituting impeachments in one part of 
the legislative body, and of determining them upon them the other .... 
This is alone a complete security. . . . [J]udges ... would hazard the 
united resentment of the [legislature] ... while its body was possessed 
of the means of punishing their presumption by degrading them from 
their stations. 24 
Nonetheless, as if anticipating that the existence of structural safe­
guards would fail to convince every reader that federal judges would not 
24. THE FEDERALIST No. 8 1, at 484 (A. Hamilton) (C. Rossiter ed. 1961). 
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exceed their just and intended bounds, The Federalist offered bits of nor­
mative theory. It offered normative theories of judicial role morality and 
judicial character. It offered, as discussed, normative theories of inter­
pretation. Both types of normative theories imply guidelines for judicial 
selection and training. The judicial role calls for individuals with com­
mon sense, uncommon rational judgment, knowledge of legal traditions, 
(including traditions of interpretation and construction), and knowledge 
of the public good. The judicial role also requires control over passions 
that cloud judgment and weaken one's ability to repress self-interest for 
the sake of the public good. The Federalist's message is that such "phi­
losopher judges" exist and have been relied on in the past with over­
whelmingly positive results. 
III. 
As previously noted, Tushnet argues that "it [is] futile at best to rely 
on The Federalist's theory of constitutional interpretation. "25 In effect, 
he argues that it is futile in practice and in theory. 
It is futile in practice because "contrary to recent commentary, even 
separation of powers decisions cannot readily rest on plain meaning anal­
ysis."26 Immigration and Naturalization Service v. Chadha,27 the legisla­
tive veto case, serves as an illustrative example. In Chadha the Court 
ruled unconstitutional provisions of the Immigration and Nationality 
Act ("Act") empowering either House of Congress to overturn by resolu­
tion a decision of the Executive Branch. The Court affirmed a Ninth 
Circuit ruling that under the separation of powers doctrine the House of 
Representatives lacked constitutional authority to deport an alien whose 
deportation an Immigration Judge had suspended on account of extreme 
hardship pursuant to authority delegated by Congress to the Attorney 
General. In addition to the Act's legislative veto provision, the legisla­
tive veto provisions of numerous federal statutes in which Congress had 
retained the authority to undo the determinations of agencies to which it 
had delegated powers fell. 28 
Chadha depicted utilitarian or functional interpretations of the Con­
stitution as a threat to the values of democratic self-government. Func­
tional interpretation is unwarranted where "[e]xplicit and unambiguous 
25. Tushnet, supra note 2, at 1693. 
26. !d. 
27. 462 u.s. 919 (1982). 
28. See generally Spann, Deconszructing the Legislative Veto, 68 MINN. L. REv. 473 (1984) 
(analysis of Chadha, legislative vetoes, and indeterminacy problem). 
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provisions of the Constitution prescribe and define the respective func­
tions of the Congress and of the Executive."29 Tushnet shows that the 
Chadha case is an object lesson in the futility of plain meaning interpreta­
tive theories since even constitutional provisions defining and prescribing 
legislative and executive functions prove to be less than "explicit and 
unambiguous." Tushnet's analysis reveals that the Supreme Court was 
simply mistaken in its claim that the case before it could be decided 
solely by reference to the Constitution's "explicit and unambiguous" lan­
guage. For example, the Chief Justice asserted the case would be 
resolved by the "precise terms" of the Constitution. 30 Yet, the Court had 
to decide at least one matter not subject to resolution by the "precise 
terms" of the Constitution: whether a one-house veto based on a resolu­
tion entered by a single member of Congress was an exercise of legislative 
power. The Court reached its decision about whether legislative power 
had been exercised by assessing the purposes and effects of the action 
taken by the House. 
Tushnet argues that it is futile in theory to rely on plain meaning 
analysis because modern social philosophy and philosophy of language 
indicate that there are no plain meanings. He states that plain meaning 
analysis is at odds with the "unavailability of plain meanings to resolve 
normative disputes."31 He also takes the position that the phenomenon 
of honest disputes over the meaning of texts would seem to prove that 
written law lacks plain meaning of the requisite sort. Tushnet thus con­
cludes that plain meaning analysis is opposed both by the social reality of 
disputes over the meaning of legal texts and by the fundamentally non­
linguistic character of those disputes. 
Tushnet interprets modern philosophy of language, symbolized by 
ideas associated with the enigmatic philosopher Ludwig Wittgenstein, to 
support one of three alternative propositions, each of which he believes to 
be devastating to the plain meaning interpretative theory. The proposi­
tions are that: (1) real contests over the common sense meanings of 
words cannot occur; (2) real contests over the common sense meanings of 
words can occur, but the winners are those who rely on ordinary lan­
guage; or (3) real contests over the common sense meanings of words can 
29. Chadha, 462 U.S. at 945. 
30. I d. Article I, section I, of the Constitution providing that ''All legislative powers herein 
granted shall be vested in a Congress of the United States, which shall consist of a Senate and a 
House of Representatives," was the key constitutional provision with ''precise terms" that the court 
found "critical to the resolution." ld. This is the so-called bicameralism requirement. 
3 1. Tushnet, supra note 2, at 1693. 
l 
\ 
\ 
i 
I 
I 
-� 
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occur, but there can be no winners because disputes over language mean­
ing have no rational resolution. It is far from obvious that these 
"Wittgensteinian" propositions can indeed be adapted from their home 
in puzzlement over metaphysical, epistemological, and metaethical dis­
course to puzzles over ordinary legal discourse. 32 
Assuming the plausibility of Tushnet's adaptation, his conclusion 
that plain meaning analysis is a sinkhole looks promising. For if the first 
"Wittgensteinian" proposition is true, one must explain away the appear­
ance of real disputes over the meaning of ordinary legal discourse. If the 
second is true, judges must be viewed as arbiters of common sense and 
some political account for why they should have that role must be given. 
If the third proposition is true, courts are robbed of any ability to ration­
alize their resolution of disputes about what the written law requires. 
There would be nothing for the courts to say once, to borrow a line from 
Wittgenstein, they had shown the fly the way out of the fly-bottle. 33 
32. Wittgenstein had a great deal to say about language meaning. In Tractatus-Logico 
Philosophicus, he advanced the view that the meaning, if any, of a proposition that is neither empiri­
cally or logically grounded is unspeakable; hence the cryptic ending of his book-What we cannot 
speak about we must pass over in silence--twice alluded to in Tushnet's symposium paper. See 
generally L. WITTGENSTEIN, TRACTATUS-LOGICO PHILOSOPHICUS (1921) (analysis of relationships 
among propositional logic, facts, and hearing). Wittgenstein's views underwent a significant change 
after Tractatus. The views both of the "early" and the "later" Wittgenstein seem to have influenced 
Tushnet. 
In Philosophical Investigations Wittgenstein suggested that the key to meaning is often to be 
found in language use; language as used in what he called "language games" rooted in so-called 
"forms of life." See generally L. WITTGENSTEIN, PHILOSOPHICAL INVESTIGATIONS, (G.E.M. 
Anscombe trans. 3d ed. 1958) (exposition of the linguistic nature of philosophical problems). 
Wittgenstein's attack on traditional philosophy, the heart of his work, was that philosophical pro­
positions were not part of a language game rooted in a genuine form of life. The real task of philoso­
phy is not ethical or metaphysical, but grammatical. Its proper role is "uncovering . . plain 
nonsense and .. . bumps understanding has got running its head up against the limits of language." 
!d. � 119, at 48. 
Wittgenstein was centrally concerned with the methods of philosophy and the possibility of 
philosophical discourse. He made no direct contributions to the analysis of legal discourse. The 
crucial determination of a Wittgensteinian analysis of legal discourse may be whether we can think 
of legal discourse as a ordinary language game situated within a form of life. If we can, adopting 
Wittgenstein's functional approach to the meaning of legal propositions is indicated. 
Wittgenstein had a great deal to say about meaning and almost nothing to say about law. He 
rarely used legal examples. But see L. WITTGENSTEIN, ZETTEL 22 (G.E. M. Anscombe trans. 1970) 
(posthumous compilation of fragmentary notes) (" 'This law was not given with such cases in view.' 
Does that mean it is senseless?"). He wrote about rules, see, e. g., PHILOSOPHICAL INVESTIGATIONS, 
supra, �� 201, 240, but usually about "rules" of language games. My very tentative conclusion is 
that Wittgenstein's analysis of rules does not lend unqualified support to the proponents of legal rule­
indeterminacy in the current rule-indeterminacy debates. Cf Solum, On the Indeterminacy Crisis: 
Critiquing Critical Dogma, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 464, 477 (1987) (disputing the notion that language 
and legal rules are significantly indeterminate). 
33. L. WITfGENSTEIN, PHILOSOPHICAL INVESTIGATIONS, supra note 32, at 103 (309). 
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Viewed through Tushnet's eyes as essays impossibly premised on the 
possibility of plain meaning interpretation, The Federalist is a work of 
considerable irony. Addressed to the citizens of New York, The Federal­
ist papers were intended to help persuade the public that opposition to 
the proposed federal Constitution was misguided. The irony is that 
efforts at persuading the public often involved explaining that the puta­
tive plain meaning of constitutional provisions had been "wrongly" inter­
preted in the popular press by intelligent opponents. This irony is 
perhaps nowhere more manifest than in The Federalist 83. 
In The Federalist 83, Hamilton faced the difficult task of explaining 
the plain meaning of constitutional text while also explaining why that 
plain meaning had escaped his adversaries. Hamilton's specific aim was 
to counter the assertion that, since juries for criminal causes were 
expressly guaranteed, the silence of the proposed Constitution as to jury 
trials in civil cases entailed the constitutional abolition of civil jury trials. 
Hamilton sought to counter any misconception that the Constitution 
diminished such a cherished individual right. Casting the issue as one of 
the proper interpretation of the meaning of a text, Hamilton undertook 
to consider whether a text granting a right in one context could be inter­
preted as denying the right in another. 
It seems that if the Constitution's words had plain meaning, the dis­
pute about whether the Constitution abolished civil jury trials would not 
have arisen. Hamilton's account of why it arose attests to the strength of 
his reliance, at least in The Federalist 83, on the plain meaning theory. 
The dispute did not exist, according to Hamilton, because the meaning of 
the text was unavailable to common sense for the text was perfectly clear 
when read in accordance with the rigors of common sense, logic, and 
traditional maxims of legal construction, correctly applied. 34 Hamilton's 
ultimate explanation for the dispute was his opponents' intellectual bad 
faith. 35 He strongly implied that their rights-based opposition dishon­
estly masked a partisan anti-federalist political agenda. 
Significantly, Hamilton did not ask the plain meaning argument to 
stand alone in The Federalist 83. He also sought to convince his readers 
that the lack of express provision for civil jury trial was of no practical 
34. THE FEDERALIST No. 83, at 495-96 (A. Hamilton) (C. Rossieter ed. 1961) ("To argue with 
respect to the latter would, however, be as vain and fruitless as to attempt the serious proof of the 
existence of malter, or to demonstrate any of those propositions which, by their own internal evi­
dence, force conviction when expressed in language adapted to convey their meaning."). 
35. Opponents resort to "contemptible" subtleties, they pervert "true meaning," they deny 
what is plain to "[E]very man of discernment." !d. at 496. 
-
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importance because the right to a civil jury was well-grounded in com­
mon law. Civil jury rights were recognized, he assured his readers, even 
in states like Connecticut where the written law made no express provi­
sion for them. 36 
Interestingly, the Chadha case seems to rest on the same logic that 
Hamilton ridiculed in The Federalist 83. In Chadha, the Chief Justice 
argued as follows: since the framers had expressly provided certain 
exceptions to bicameralism and presidential presentment, it must be 
inferred that other exceptions to bicameralism and presentment, such as 
the one-house veto, were prohibited.37 In The Federalist 83 Hamilton 
ridiculed anti-federalists who relied on the maxim that "[t]he expression 
of one thing is the exclusion of another."38 Yet this would appear to be 
the maxim of construction on which Chadha relied: the expression of 
exceptions to bicameralism and presidential presentment excludes fur­
ther exceptions. 
The matter is more complicated. Hamilton did not ridicule all uses 
of the above maxim. He seemed to imply that the maxim itself had "true 
meaning," but was subject to "perverted" applications. An application is 
perverse when it is contrary to common sense and reason. The difficulty 
Hamilton's assessment poses is the uncertainty it raises about how to 
determine when a use of a maxim of construction is perverse and when it 
is true. 
Hamilton himself thought it was as clear as "the existence of mat­
ter" that his opponent's application was perverted. 39 However, in a 
post-Cartesian world, even matter is up for grabs. More to the point, the 
legal conclusions we care most about rarely "by their own internal evi­
dence force conviction."40 This makes Hamilton's plain meaning remedy 
useless unless it is somehow possible to specify the methods of common 
sense, reason, and construction that courts should rely on to reveal 
whether a maxim of construction applies in a given instance, and with 
what result. 
If Hamilton would not balk at the maxim of construction Chadha 
relied on, he might nonetheless be unsettled by a Supreme Court that 
purports to safeguard majoritarian legislation by declining to be wise: 
36. Jd. at 503. 
37. See Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 955-56. 
38. THE FEDERALIST No. 83, at 496 (quoting legal maxims) (C. Rossiter ed. 1961). 
39. !d. at 496 ("But as the inventors of this fallacy have attempted to support it by certain legal 
maxims of interpretation which they have perverted from their true meaning . .. .  "). 
40. Jd. 
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"We begin, of course, with the presumption that the challenged statute is 
valid. Its wisdom is not the concern of the courts; if a challenged action 
does not violate the Constitution, it must be sustained."41 This is the 
"judgment" to which Justices of the Supreme Court have sometimes 
aspired. It is a process of blind application of Constitution to statute, a 
process which purportedly depends upon ascertaining the unambiguous 
meanings of each. 
Outside of the confines of theories of interpretation and adjudica­
tion, "judgment" today connotes a process that engages all of a person's 
cognitive and moral resources. Judgment is a weighing of wants and 
needs, deserts and merits, morality and utility. This weighing, of course, 
is precisely what judicial judgment is not according to Chadha.42 The 
narrower scope of judicial judgment advocated in Chadha is impossible, 
if Tushnet's critique of plain meaning is correct, for it presupposes that 
legal texts have meanings apart from those a court might like most to 
attach to them and that a good judge is able to discern those meanings. 43 
In The Federalist 78 Hamilton wrote that under the new Constitu­
tion federal judges would be expected to exercise "judgment" rather than 
"will." Any will they exercised as a co-equal branch would presumably 
be the will to judge in accordance with the law. Hamilton believed that 
the judiciary was the most "feeble" and least dangerous branch. The 
legislature "commands the purse" and "prescribes the rules" and the 
judiciary "must ultimately depend upon the aid of the executive arm 
even for the efficacy of its judgments. "44 But it is doubtful that Hamil­
ton, who believed the judiciary was essential to safeguard liberty, would 
4 1. Hamilton stated, "The rules of legal interpretation are rules of common sense, adopted by 
the courts in the construction of the laws. The true test, therefore, of a just application of them is its 
conformity to the source from which they are derived. This being the case, let me ask if it is consis­
tent with reason or common sense to suppose, that a provision obliging the legislative power to 
commit the trial of criminal causes to juries is a privation of its right to authorize or permit that 
mode of trial in other cases?" !d. at 496. 
If this fails as a reductio ad absurdum of the anti-federalist criticism of the Constitution, it is 
because whether things not promised in a writing are excluded depends upon customary understand­
ings and practices rather than the rules of deductive logic. 
42. 462 U.S. at 944. 
43. 462 U.S. at 944 ("the fact that a given law or procedure is efficient, convenient, and useful 
in facilitating functions of government, standing alone, will not save it if it is contrary to the 
Constitution"). 
44. Hence the Court could cite with approval: "Once the meaning of an enactment is dis­
cerned and its constitutionality determined, the judicial process comes to an end. We do not sit as a 
committee of review, nor are we vested with the power of veto." TVA v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 194-95 
( 1978), cited in INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 9 19, 944 (1982). 
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have accepted the formulation of Chadha whereby concern for the wis­
dom of a decision is contrasted with concern for its bare constitutional­
ity. For the guiding assumption of The Federalist was that the 
Constitution-"the intention of the people"-is to be "regarded by the 
judges as, a fundamental law" for the advancement of the public good 
and individual rights.45 
To the extent of their skepticism about objectively valid conceptions 
of "natural rights" and "the public good," contemporary plain meaning 
theorists are hard pressed to reconcile what they ask judges to do with 
fuller, contemporary conceptions of judgment. Plain meaning theory 
was perhaps better suited to a less skeptical, less relativist era. 
The Federalist 83 is an especially good indicator that the plain 
meaning theory that can be attributed to The Federalist is not a simple­
minded one. Consider a simple-minded plain meaning theory holding 
that each canonical text in a language has a set of distinct meanings and 
that these meanings will always be plain to any speaker of the language. 
This simple-minded theory essentially denies ambiguity, ignorance, and 
other barriers to written communication. It is a "straw man" theory too 
implausible to be taken seriously. As Tushnet understands, textualist 
theories can be very sophisticated.46 The ironic "meaning-explaining" 
character of The Federalist project, Hamilton's treatment of a meaning 
dispute in The Federalist 83, and the recalcitrant "dead letter" language 
of The Federalist 22, are all indications of the complexity and sophistica­
tion of any plain meaning theory that is fairly attributed to The Federal­
ist. For Publius, the meaning of written law is plain, but only when texts 
are well-drafted in modes of discourse open to discernment, reason and 
common sense, and when those who purport to apply the texts rely on 
true and proper maxims of construction. 
45. THE FEDERALIST No. 78, at 467 (A. Hamilton) (C. Rossiter ed. 1961). 
46. Tushnet, supra note 10, at 690. 
